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ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to address the newest issue arising between songwriters and their record
companies in the music industry which is the underpayment of royalties. This paper will seek to answer
if with more and more artists and songwriters suing for compensation due to underpayment of
royalties, will artists lose the incentive to create new music and eventually decrease overall production?
Clearly defining and regulating intellectual property and the use and efficiency of contracts will be topics
for discussion. After testing my hypothesis, some results show no decrease, whereas, other results
report some decrease in record company and songwriter incentives and in production. Therefore, in
conclusion, the finding is that there is no clear association between underpayment and lack of
production.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis poses the question of whether recent changes in the music industry specifically, the
introduction of the digital era through the internet and internet sources, has or will eventually have an
effect on the overall production of new music. Also in question, have the record companies’
classification of sale royalties and license royalties been or will they become a driving force in the
decrease of music production? Sale royalties and license royalties are the two main ways record
companies and songwriters receive royalty payment, which is a major source of profit in the music
industry. Contracts between music labels, performing rights organizations, songwriters, and artists will
be examined. How or if contracts have changed to adjust to the new development and the inclusion of
digital music will be examined. As regulations have changed over time to accommodate new outlets of
music, contracts have been adjusted to benefit artists and songwriters. These contracts define the terms
of compensation for all parties, and other terms that will give songwriters the incentive to create new
music.
I argue that when the internet introduced a new outlet for music distribution, contract terms for
record companies and songwriters lost their clarity. Determining provisions from royalties became a
point of contention and decreased the marginal revenue and marginal benefit of producing new music. I
hypothesize that the incentive or motivation for songwriters to produce new music decreases and the
overall production of new music decreases over time. After collecting and comparing data on the
amount of new music produced by different artists before and after the digital era began, and analyzing
a case study, I find that when more emphasis is placed on the definition of a sale royalty and a license
royalty in contracts and a songwriter’s intellectual rights are clearly defined and are upheld by all
parties, incentives and production will not decrease over time.
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In recent years, the popularity of the internet has given consumers unlimited access to music through
iTunes and other, sources of file sharing. These changes have caused friction between music companies
and songwriters, specifically concerning royalties. By definition, a royalty is a payment that is given to a
company or an individual that creates a song and owns the rights for the asset to be distributed. Even
though there were disputes with songwriters and companies before the digital age, recently more
songwriters have sued their record companies over royalties that they believed have not been paid or
for not receiving the correct payment from music downloading, ringtones, or other digital music outlets.
This paper addresses the differences in intellectual rights for a songwriter’s asset, which in this case
would be the song and the songwriter’s royalties before and after the digital age in the United States.
Also addressed will be what changes were made to the system, and how they were interpreted in
contracts, to ensure all parties involved get their share of revenue?
The distinction between a sale royalty and a license royalty is very blurred in the music industry.
When a songwriter and record company form a contract, they have the option of obtaining revenue by
selling a consumer, which is defined as an individual or company purchasing a song from the record
company through a sale or a license. The consumer purchasing a copy of a song for entertainment
purposes only would be a sale royalty. A license royalty involves a consumer buying a master copy from
the record company. These transactions are usually done by radio stations, TV programs, and movie
production companies. This entitles the consumer, defined as the individual or company purchasing
from the record company, to record, perform, duplicate, redistribute and gain a profit from the song
they purchased from the record company. Currently, sale royalties are given to the songwriter and the
record company for digital downloading. But, songwriters believe digital purchases should be considered
as license royalties because internet companies take masters of songwriters’ song recordings and sell
copies to individuals for profit. Further discussion of this topic is explained in the analysis.

2

The government regulates and enforces issues of royalties. Performing right organizations
(PROs) monitor and enforce issues of royalties on behalf of songwriters. There are four PROs in the
United States: The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music
Incorporated (BMI), the Sound Exchange, and the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers
(SESAC). The United States Copyright Royalty Board, a government service organization, in association
with the Library of Congress, executes digital performance rights laws written in 1995. The Copyright
Royalty Board maintains and enforces royalty rates that record companies and PROs set. In April 2012, a
United States Court declared that the Board would officially be responsible for maintaining and
enforcing royalty rates from digital downloads.
Before the evolution of the internet, most revenue came from record sales, sheet music sold,
royalties for performing in public, and songs that are used in movies or T.V. The songwriter or the
company who creates the song lyrics and registers it with the Library of Congress is considered the
owner of the song. The owner has the right to record, distribute, reproduce, alter, or perform the song
publicly, live, or through radio, TV, or other means of media. If the owner decides to musically record
the song, the songwriter, record company, or a separate artist, can register the song recording with the
Library of Congress to become the owner of the song recording copyright, which is different from
owning the right to the song lyrics. When someone owns the song recording, usually a record company,
then that owner has the right to distribute and publicly perform the song, but not alter the lyrics or
melody of the song. Royalties are usually paid through copyright licensing. When the asset holder, who
is the owner of the sound recording, gives permission to other parties to use a song they receive
payment through licensing. They are paid through sales when the asset holder gives permission to
purchase a song only for listening. PROs, as well as, mechanical rights agencies keep track of royalties
that needs to be paid. For example, in a diagram given by the ASCAP, PROs monitor various outlets for
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how many times a song is played in a period of time, and the money they receive from the those outlets
is given to the songwriters in the form of royalties.
Table 1.1 How PROs keep track of royalties

Source: ASCAP
Because the internet has given consumers other outlets for downloading music, royalties are harder to
track so asset holders lose the money they would receive in royalties because of free file sharing
websites. Websites including iTunes and Amazon have become popular outlets used by younger
consumers to download music, as noted in the chart below.
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Table 1.2 Spending on recorded music

Source: The Economist

This table show that individuals ages 20-29 use iTunes and other internet sources as the primary
sources of distributing music, suggesting that over time, the internet would become the main outlet of
obtaining music. As the internet becomes a main source for music for all ages, the clarity of contract
terms becomes more important for record companies and songwriters. When contract terms are
clarified, the record companies and songwriters are able to receive just compensation from digital
downloading and the incentives to produce new music will not decrease. In an article written by The
Economist magazine, the internet is a huge distribution outlet and could arguably bring a large amount
of revenue to record companies and songwriters alike. ITunes and other legal music downloading sites
are a major alleviator in recovering unpaid royalties to asset owners, but evidently, the problem still
exists due to many reports of songwriters and artists suing over payments. With the infusion of these
internet outlets come major concerns for the record companies and for the songwriters taking issue
with the selling of their music and making revenue from their music.
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The most crucial part to this study is the answers to the question of what constitutes a sale
royalty and what constitutes license royalty concerning digital music. Before the creation of digital
downloading, the answer was understandable. Physical goods, like CDs that were sold to consumers
were sales. Licensing sold the right to record, duplicate, distribute, or perform the song. Now, with
digital downloading, record companies sell to digital retailers like iTunes a single master recording, not a
license, which those retailers in turn duplicate for customers. The fact that digital retailers duplicate a
record makes this transaction have “license like” characteristics.
Volker Lehmann classifies four types of licensing: attribution, noncommercial, no derivatives
works, and share alike. The attribution type will essentially give the person a copyright, as long as the
person gives the person who actually holds the copyright credit for their work. The noncommercial type
will apply to regular consumers, DJs, and artists who want to sample an artist’s work. This type allows
people to do the same as people who choose attribution; the only exception is that they must use it for
a noncommercial purpose. The no derivative works option allows the consumer to do everything except
create a new song from the original work. Lastly, share alike type will allow derivative work to be
distributed under the same license as the original work the derivative was taken from. There are other
exceptions to these four types including the Sampling License, a Public Domain Dedication, a Founder’s
Copyright, a Music Sharing License and a Developing Nations License. After the digital era began to pick
up speed, Preston and Rogers write that record companies began to make alliances with social networks
to license their music by various artists to be distributed by social networks and record companies
preserved the right to have certain copyrighted work removed if they felt it was necessary. These
alliances of license agreements have recently have evolved to include new websites such as Vevo, a
outlet of You Tube and outlets allowing consumers to gain access to live performances as well as
recordings of their favorite songs. This brings about more revenue for the record companies, but not
necessarily to the songwriter.
6

Songwriters receive royalties through sales and licensing of music. Since more rights are
granted to the individual or company when purchasing a license, they are required to pay more to
obtain a license, meaning the songwriter is paid more licenses sold than sales sold. Licensing royalties
are a songwriter’s preferred choice of payment since they historically receive more from a license than
they do from a sale, no matter which outlet is used. Songwriters believe licensing applies to the internet
because of the fact the iTunes and other internet companies similar to iTunes purchase master
recordings from record companies to make a profit by selling music to individuals for a profit. If a
songwriter feels they are being underpaid for their services, they lose the incentive to create and
produce new music, which leads to a decrease in the production and the selection of new music for
consumers.
This paper will attempt to present substantial evidence highlighting the issue of royalties in a
detailed case study involving Aftermath Records and F.B.T. Productions. F.B.T. Productions contends
that the company was underpaid as a result of the revenue from digital downloads being counted as
sale royalties rather than license royalties. Aftermath Records contends that Aftermath and F.B.T agreed
that downloads would be treated as sales and the two parties would receive sale royalties. This case
study gives an example of unclear contract terms leading to problems of royalties and a decrease in
incentive to create new music. Other applications are shown to support the hypothesis that contract
structure and clear provision of digital royalties will maintain or increase any incentives necessary to
promote creativity for new music and production of new music. Empirically, I expect to find that
songwriters who decide their contract with their respective record company does not give them the
greatest marginal benefit and revenue will decrease the amount of new music they produce over time.
The intention is to shed more light on the impact of the digital era and the revenue and copyright
practices of record companies, as well as address contract terms in the music industry. Section ii will
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give a theoretical framework to this analysis. Section iii will review previous literature, Section iv will
give empirical evidence, and Section v will offer an overall conclusion.
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THEORECTICAL FRAMEWORK
General topics in economics: contract structure, strong property rights, and production are
addressed. The purpose of the contract is generally to clearly define property rights. The clearly defined
property rights enable all parties to produce and sell efficiently, promote marginal costs and benefits,
and create a strong market. Marginal costs and benefits are associated with the creation of sound
property rights and contracts.
In theory, there are two parties who are involved in the creation and distribution of an asset. It
is assumed that whoever owns the title, owns the all the residuals. There are only two forms of
payment, which are a sale or a license. The residual claims to either form are given solely to the record
company, the songwriter, or the claims are shared by the two. The residual claims include profit in the
form of royalties from purchases, more specifically suited for this thesis, digital purchases. The residual
claims and claimants are listed in a contract between all parties involved. The digital world makes it hard
for record companies to monitor songwriters or vice versa, and this monitoring process is more
expensive.
The issue of defining property rights relates costs associated with establishing, monitoring, and
enforcing rights. The internet created a new market essentially for record companies to capitalize and
make a large profit. This is because when digital downloading first became available to consumers,
websites and programs like Napster invited consumers to easily download songs for cheap or even free
of cost. As more and more individuals began to obtain their music over the internet record companies
began to seek revenue by setting up their own alliances with iTunes. However, it became extremely
difficult, as well as costly to stop websites like Napster who didn’t have alliances with the record
companies from forming and seizing the opportunity to obtain additional revenue. Enlisting the help of
the government alleviated some of the cost of enforcement; however, digital downloading is still listed

9

as a problem by songwriters. Songwriters believe that since record companies sell master sound
recordings to music downloading websites that those purchases should be treated as licenses rather
than sales. Now that there is digital downloading, a songwriter’s intellectual property, the song, is so
easily distributed and accessible to everyone that costs are extremely high for both record companies
and songwriters. Restricting access of the songs through government regulation and legal websites like
iTunes increases the value of assets and gives songwriters and record companies more incentive to
monitor the market and obtain a better profit.
A song and a song recording can be considered nonexclusive resources, as explained by Steven
Cheung. Nonexclusive, for the purpose of this paper, means that a song is distributed and is not
depleted or doesn’t go away as more consumers download the song. He continues that a contract may
not even exist implicitly or explicitly with nonexclusive resources. The costs of enforcing policies and
making sure the marginal revenue and benefits to all parties are the same will most likely be exceedingly
higher than contracts with exclusive resources. This could give some insight as to why songwriters or
PROs don’t clearly establish or enforce the revenue seeking practices of record companies. Though PROs
are established to serve and protect songwriters and their rights, they are not able to pay the marginal
costs of continuously enforcing contract terms with record companies.
In the book Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law, a property rights entrepreneur is a
person who sees the marginal benefits of defining and enforcing property rights and is able to reduce
marginal costs to receive a larger gain. When new markets open, the marginal benefit of utilizing the
market becomes greater. As the property rights entrepreneurs enforce and monitor rights, the marginal
cost will eventually decrease by the entrepreneurs’ working with the government and forming alliances
to decrease costs. Consequently, the party that is able to see all costs and benefits associated with
utilizing the market will capitalize on the opportunity. Creators of Napster and iTunes along with record
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companies could be considered the property rights entrepreneurs of the internet. As the internet
became a tool in the downloading of music, record companies teamed up with music websites to
capitalize on the gains of music downloads.
The principal-agent model, an economic model, would be a plausible fit with the property rights
theory. An agent’s job is to produce or to serve the principal’s desires. This would be similar to a
politician overseeing and protecting the interests of their constituents. There is the possibility of an
agent abusing their given power by using other sources and accumulating gains for their own benefit as
a politician could be swayed by lobbyists for gains that are not for the good of all constituents. The
downside to the principal-agent model, according to Anderson and McChesney, would be that principals
“are not residual claimants to the rents they help create”. Consequently, if claimants or principals don’t
receive the rents that they create, then they don’t have the incentive to enforce rules for their s agents.
Agents then are inclined to act on their own behalf rather than on the behalf of their principal. The
solution lies in effectively monitoring agents who supervise the rents created from property rights. If this
doesn’t happen, this could result in institutions not being as strong or as efficient as institutions where
agents were less corrupt and catered to the needs of the principals. The table is an illustration of the
principal-agent model applied to the music industry.
Table 2.1 Principal-agent model in the Music Industry
Principal (Songwriter)
Agent (Record Company)
Gives or shares their rights of
Responsible for the
their song with record
reproduction, promotion, and
company
distribution of song
Trusts record company to
Pays royalties to songwriter
receive residual claims made
from song
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Enforcer (pro, Government)
Government sets royalty rates
for record company to pay
PROs responsible for tracking
what royalties are owed to
songwriters
Both PROs and government
hold record companies
accountable for royalties not
paid

When the government and PROs effectively enforce and monitor record companies, songwriters and
record companies will be able to form strong, clearly defined contracts and maintain the production of
new music.
The music industry could also be considered to use a buyout system, a form of the principalagent model, with the record company and the songwriter. The songwriter (principal) entrusts the
record company (agent) to distribute and sell their product and should be confident that the contract
will include provisions that ensure that the record company won’t make decisions only for their own
monetary benefit. As of right now, agents seem to follow the theory of principals and agents. On the
other hand, PROs serve as monitors of the agents. Although they essentially don’t have superior power
over agents, they do have a significant amount of power to defend and assist songwriters ex ante
finalizing a contract.
Another model to consider is the model of asset ownership created by Sanford Grossman and
Oliver Hart (1986). This model explains “when one firm will desire to acquire the assets of another firm.”
The contract type, details of the contract, and costs associated with parties in a long term contract
relate more closely to the issues of royalties in the music industry and clear uncertainties between
licenses and sales. When contract terms are clear, the uncertainties of who gets paid what and how they
are paid are clear, so songwriters will not have to worry about losing revenue or benefits and their
incentive to create new music will increase. The asset ownership model could give a better
understanding of economic issues including who has control over residual rights, the incentives to
produce, and if the loss of incentives can eventually decrease production. Theoretical insight to possible
changes to a contract’s flexibility or rigidness before and after the internet may find that if this new
model is applied to the music industry, a contract with clear, detailed terms will more likely be possible
for all parties involved (Hart, 2007).
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In forming contracts, parties make sure to define and enforce contract terms that will give them
the biggest gain, and not necessarily for social benefit. If a contract makes the record company better
off concerning profit or incentives than the songwriter or vice versa, and there is an optimal amount of
production, then the fact that the other party is worse off or at least no better off doesn’t make any
difference as long as production is maintained and doesn’t decrease. When a party being worse off
eventually leads to a less amount of production, then changes or adjustments will probably be made
even when the cost of contract is high to better accommodate all parties. There is also the possibility
that the opportunity of a large profit could cause post-contractual opportunism (Klein, Crawford,
Alchain, 1978). After contracts have been formed and there is a large profit from music downloading,
songwriters see it as an opportunity to gain more revenue and a better reputation. Record companies
have the opportunity gain more revenue as well by enhancing marketing strategies on the internet.
The record company could be selling digital music as a sale rather than a license in order to
receive greater revenue for a songwriter’s music. Owners withholding services of a specialized asset to
receive a greater share could cause problems in the music industry and in other industries as well.
According to Anderson and McChesney, fixing the problem would mean either to “purchase the
specialized input outright or be able to monitor its contributions so as to identify opportunistic behavior
by the owner.” In the music industry, if a songwriter can’t monitor the contributions he or she makes in
obtaining revenue for digital music, a songwriter has the choice of being the sole owner of the rights to
their song recordings choosing not to share their copyright with the record company. The costs,
however, of purchasing, promoting, and distributing music can be extremely high for a songwriter.
These high costs cause the songwriter to continue their relationship with the record company and
renegotiate with the company to receive the maximum benefit.

13

If contracts have a basic structure, that is terms that specify distribution of income for all parties
and the conditions of using and selling resources, then the relationship between the parties involved
should be a positive working relationship (Cheung, 1970). If a contract is missing foundations of its
structure, then some parties can be worse off over time and may lose the incentive to produce or work
with the other parties included in the contract over time. Songwriters who are worse off compared to
record companies concerning profit and incentives eventually lose their incentive to create new music
and the overall production in the music industry will decline over time.
Focusing solely on digital downloading, in the case of recent lawsuits artists have claimed they
have been “underpaid.” They state that publisher (the record company) has been recording digital
downloads as sales rather than licensing downloads, which would lead to higher royalties. They claim
that when downloading sites like iTunes purchase music from record companies, the websites are given
a master copy of songwriters’ music, which is usually done when a company or individual wants to
license a songwriter’s music. This becomes a case of establishing a sound contract agreement, where
the distinction of royalties and sales are agreed on by all parties, or using a similar method like Towse’s
principal agent method. Are there economic models that are better suited, or more efficient in making
sure all parties receive their correct amount of royalties for all distributions?
In the derivation of a contract between a record company and a songwriter, the record company
usually decides how to pay a songwriter for their services by examining their popularity at that present
time, and determining how successful the song in negotiating could be. Economically, the royalty rate
setting, and the artist reputation are considered in the marginal cost of production for the record
company. More successful artists, successful in this case meaning if an artist sales more than a million
songs sold per album, have a better chance and leverage to negotiate price. There is then the probability
that the more in royalties an artist gets the less profit the record company will receive. If the record
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company is working with a new artist, the incentive for the record company to pay songwriters by
licensing and paying songwriters according to the number of sales the song makes is much lower than
just paying a lump sum to an artist. When a songwriter becomes more successful and has a reputation
of producing highly profitable songs, the record companies’ incentive to license will be higher and will it
be more willing to obtain residual claims for the songwriter. Contracts in the music industry would most
likely contain terms that monitor an asset, which in this case would be a song and the residual claims to
the asset once it’s been produced and distributed. A songwriter could use the buyout method, where
the songwriters receive a lump sum for their song and don’t receive the residual claims after the song is
distributed. The record company can share the copyright of their song with whatever party they choose,
which for this paper will be a record company, or a songwriter could even create his or her own record
company, which is not explored in this paper.
The danger for a songwriter agreeing to the buyout method might be if a song becomes highly
successful, the record company will want the songwriter to keep creating so that they can continue to
reap the rewards. However, that incentive to create new music may dwindle if they always receive the
same amount of money. Of course, this could be a win win since reputation is a large incentive for
artists. If the tables were turned (which is probably unlikely), record companies would lose the incentive
to work with songwriters when the songwriters receive the residual claims. Using an optimal contract,
the residuals can be shared by both the record company and the songwriter. Having a contract that
clearly defines residual claims will give more of a guarantee that songwriters will receive compensation
for their creativity and record companies will receive a decent profit that is more than the costs of mass
distribution. Even though in most cases of larger, well known record companies, the cost could be
considered relatively cheap for record companies, there could be an instance that the economic benefit
of producing an artist’s album is too low or the marginal benefit is considered to be too high. Most
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contracts between the record company and a songwriter do include the costs of packaging and
distribution of albums no matter the success of artists.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
While most economic research that has been done to explain copyrights theoretically, only few
economists explored this literature empirically. Volker Lehmann theoretically wrote how new outlets of
technology bring about new ways of production, disregarding what the new outlet might do to the old
outlet. He mentions that file sharing websites like Napster became such a threat to record companies
because of the large amount of profit the sites were able to take away. They were able to take so much
away from the record companies because the websites were able to operate with essentially no
transaction costs. This gave the record companies an incentive to enforce rights of distribution to
consumers concerning the internet. The record companies claimed that not only were songwriters and
artists not being compensated, but the record companies were not receiving a large profit either, and
overall music sales fell by 30%. The author then moves on to discuss the cases of various artists and
record companies fighting with individual downloaders and websites in the form of lawsuits to protect
property. In contradiction to Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons, Lehmann talks about the Tragedy of the
Anti-Commons. He touches on the issue that the government has no direct influence on the use and
distribution of rights. This can be considered one of the reasons that there are no clear terms in
contracts between songwriters and record companies. Lehmann claims that the lack of centralization
increases the transaction costs of record companies to distribute, produce, and use copyrights in the
music industry. Lehmann says that adjusting current enforcement of copyrights in the music industry
doesn’t fix the “root” of the problems of enforcement, but rather focus should be given to the design of
the copyright laws and adjustments that should be made there. A solution suggested by Lehmann is for
the government to create a monopoly in the music industry where the government is easily able to
govern and control the music industry’s practices. However, Lehmann decides that this would not be the
best choice since lobbyists would most likely determine fees given to record companies and artists. He
continues that government decision making has a history of changing laws and regulation after new
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developments have been introduced, such as a new outlet like the internet. On the other hand, the
music industry thrives and capitalizes on adjusting to innovations as they happen. Overall, the author
suggests how difficult it is enforcing and finding the copyright law that will create an optimal production,
marginal cost, and marginal benefit to consumers wanting to use some type of asset in the music
industry.
Seth Ericsson goes into more detail about the creation of iTunes and its impact on the music
industry. Ericsson calls iTunes the central download that was the only outlet that supplied music from all
labels and became a more acceptable alternative to peer to peer websites like Napster and other file
sharing websites. The site’s flexible pricing and it being easy to use made it able to lure consumers away
from file sharing websites. Generally speaking, this paper speaks to the history of how the recording
industry and the innovation of online music were forced to blend together. This paper gives more
support of how the internet has become a major outlet for the music industry and the necessity for
clearly defined contract terms pertaining to the internet is vital.
Paschal Preston and Jim Rogers speak on the music industry and social networks blending
together as well, saying that the record companies “reconfigured core structures,” meaning they
invested more money and time into the internet instead of their usual avenues of distributing music like
T.V. and radio, to accommodate the booming digital world, when they originally produced most of their
sales from CDs. They offer insight into how the ownership of property rights plays a part in the music
industry re-shaping and they ask the question if sites including iTunes and Napster, have diminished the
power of record companies by being a direct source for consumers to connect to artists. Before the
digital era began, the music industry used property rights laws as a defense mechanism to combat new
technology outlets. The authors also comment that the industry’s initial reaction in the early 1990s was
to take legal action against these sites since those sites did have a direct effect on their revenue. These
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lawsuits are still brought to court. The authors found that in summer 2010, 35,000 individuals were still
awaiting their court appearance for downloading and file-sharing offences. Over time, the industry
changed to what Preston and Rodgers cal
industry “merged” into a centralized institution, where one entity handles distribution, promotion, sales,
etc. on all outlets, which overall makes the artist or songwriter worse off, since they have no choice but
to give all their rights to one publisher where before the songwriter had a choice of sharing or giving
their rights to different companies to get a better return on their investment. The record companies’
alliances with websites could also be evidence of companies trying to take hold of the market and block
new entry. Before the internet, record companies were considered the monopolist in mass distribution.
Taking hold of the internet market could make them the monopolist once again in the music industry for
mass distribution for new music. In an interview the authors conducted with eight managers in the
music industry, each manager agrees that even with the opportunities that are presented with the
internet there is no clear confirmation that the internet provides a new clear alternative to distribution
of songs and increased sales as well as other outlets like TV and radio. They report that though
songwriters could use the internet to distribute their own music, record companies still hold influence
and the power to mass distribute a songwriter’s product to all markets in all geographic regions. As far
as record companies losing their overall power in the industry, the authors conclude that though the
digital world has affected record companies, the crucial need for marketing and mass distribution makes
record companies needed and just as powerful in the music industry. The centralization of the music
industry will increase the chances that songwriters will lose their incentives to create new music, which
could decrease the amount of production of new music for the record companies. Record companies
have the comparative advantage of mass publicity and distribution through radio and T.V. Songwriters
that don’t rely on record companies would have to go to great costly measures to distribute their music
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and most likely wouldn’t earn much money or even have the option of earning money through sales or
licenses.
Industry experts were also interviewed in Martin Peitz and Patrick Waelbroeck’s research on the
impact of online distribution in the music industry, as well as other data sources. In the following table
supplied by Peitz and Waelbroek, even with the internet in place, radio is still the number one way to
influence consumers to buy music and for record companies to receive profit.
Table 3.1 Type of media that influenced US consumers to purchase their last CD (in %)
Radio
Friends/Relatives
Music Video channel
Saw in the store
Movie Soundtrack
Live performance
TV Advertisement
Featured in TV Show
TV Show Appearance
Downloaded MP3
internet
Magazine/Newspaper
internet Radio
Record Club
Video Game

75
46
45
42
37
29
24
23
22
19
17
17
15
15
5

Source: Edison Media Research, June 2003; in percentage of consumers who have purchased a music CD
in the past 12 months.

This literature provided Peitz and Waelbroek is different from previous literature for the authors
discuss opportunity costs for consumers of using computers to download music rather than purchasing
CDs. They do make mention of the decline that online downloading had on the music industry. The
individual purchasing the music from the internet will want to minimize their costs by purchasing songs
from the internet. Their opportunity costs include the time of actually using the computer to download
files, the time it takes to download files, and the threat that an individual can download a “bad” file,
whether that is a file not compressed correctly or a file with a virus. Another detail of the paper worth
mentioning is that they “infer from the success of Apple's iTunes that digital music downloaded from the
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internet will partly replace music sales in the traditional format. In this sense, it would just become
another channel through which music is distributed. Instead of selling records through record stores the
labels sell downloads through music sites.” According to Peitz and Waelbroek, this shows the big impact
of outlets on distribution. They also note how digital sites have become opportunities to sell music to
sites and they are counted as sales as opposed to licenses, which affects the revenue and overall
incentive of songwriters to produce new music.
All of the literature shows how the internet impacted the music industry and became a major
way for record companies to distribute songs and market their artists and for songwriters to make a
profit for their songs and to build a reputation. With the internet becoming such a formidable force in
the music industry record companies will take more time and money to form alliances and make profits.
Therefore, the rights between record companies and songwriters will have to be strong and clearly
defined in contracts.
Ruth Towse (2000) touches on the principal-agent model and the buyout system applied to the
music industry. She explains that this method of principal-agent is claimed to expose the “trade-off
between risk-bearing over the life of copyrighted work, the amount of effort at marketing and
maintaining the reputation of the work and the transaction costs inherited in the different payment
methods.” The paper goes on to use empirical analysis to determine if paying royalties to the agent
provides incentives to create more music. To find the amount of money most artists receive in royalties
Towse put together a table shown below. Record collecting societies from the UK, Sweden, and
Denmark respectively Musician’s Union, SAMI, and GRAMEX provided Towse with information on how
much various artist were paid in royalties and to show the distribution between artists.
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Table 3.2 Distribution of Royalties
UK
Sweden
Band of
Percent of
Band of
Distributed
Musicians
Distributed
Income
Income
(in pounds)
(in kroner)
0-90
12
0-249
91-200
16
500-999
201-500
24
1000-4999
501-1000
16
5000-9999
1001-2000
14
10000-49999
2001-5000
12
50000-99999
5001-10000
5
100000 and
over
Over 10000
1
Total:

100

Percent of
Musicians

75
16
8
1
1
Less than 1
Less than 1

Denmark
Band of
Distributed
Income
(in kroner)
0-249
250-999
1000-2999
3000-4999
5000-9999
10000-19999
20000-29999
30000 and
over

100

Percent of
Musicians

32
52
9
2
2
1
Less than 1
Less than 1
100

Source: Musician’s Union 1995, SAMI 1994, GRAMEX 1995. Exchange rates in 1995: 5.6 Danish kroner to
1 dollar, 7.3 to 1 ECU and 8.8 to 1 pound;1.7 dollars to 1 pound

Using data on individuals who received royalties for performing rights in Sweden, Denmark, and the UK,
the concluded that though there are few performers that receive a substantial payment in royalties, the
majority does not and this in turn does not create an incentive for “creativity.” Towse also concludes
that government involvement does not help in increasing incentive or production of new music.
Ivan Pitt (2010) uses data from the ASCAP 2007 annual report to estimate the optimal amount
of dollars members in a performing rights organization would want to make assuming every members
goal is to maximize income while the popularity of their song is high. Dependent variables for finding the
optimal dollar value included the money received from license, T.V., radio, internet, jingles, and the
amount of years an artist has been in the music business. Pitt finds that success or the large amount of
income that is collected by PROs is skewed, going to a small amount of asset owners because of a song’s
current popularity and high frequency in TV, radio, and other outlets. This shows that many songwriters
don’t receive a large amount of money even when the popularity of a song is high. Since songwriters
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make more money from licensing than sales royalties, songwriters will want record companies to sell
their music through licensing, so they can receive the largest amount of profit possible.
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APPLICATION
Though the literature work supports this thesis in the sense that record companies have had to
change their institutional foundations to include the digital music era, no research has delved into the
subject of how record companies classify their profit from digital sales (whether their profit is listed as a
sale or license), what the results of their classification do to the songwriters and artists that are
influenced by the sales of their product, and if that classification affects overall production.
If a songwriter chooses to sell his property or share the copyright of their song with a record
company, monitoring costs will be a factor for the record company to make sure illegal websites or a
random downloading will not interfere. The biggest deciding factor in the contract is what makes the
asset a sale or an opportunity of a license. The theory of post contractual opportunism could easily be
applied in the music industry regarding this issue. The issue of whether an asset is sold by record
companies to outlets as a sale or a license could be classified as a record company withholding services
to outlets to gain a greater share of profit, since sales of songs will give songwriters a smaller profit than
a license will, or vice versa for record companies. Actually fixing the problem is currently proving to be
difficult for songwriters. A decent solution is the use of PROs, who do step in to monitor record
companies to make sure that songwriters do get their share. This doesn’t stop more and more
songwriters and artists from suing the record companies to fix this very problem. So what would be the
next step? More government action could be a possibility. As of right now, the only government action
taken in the form of lawsuits from songwriters for record companies, as well as the United States
Copyright Royalty Board. The government’s involvement currently involves settling disputes and
maintaining current terms of how royalties are set and given to various artists. If the government was to
have more involvement of restricting the access of music on the internet or harsher punishment and
restriction on people who violate property rights, the value of property rights would increase.
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An interesting factor that could change the value of a song particularly in the music industry is
the popularity of a song, or the popularity of the artist or songwriter. A newer songwriter holds more
uncertainty of creating a highly successful song that will bring in a large amount of revenue. The more
popular an artist gets, the more uncertainty decreases, and the more likely all parties involved will gain a
bigger profit, and in turn bigger royalties due to the large number of consumers purchasing the song,
whether they are TV outlets, radio, movies, individuals purchasing CDs or digital downloading. The
opportunity of record companies receiving a bigger profit because of an artist’s or songwriter’s status
will cause the record companies and songwriters to keep a tighter hold on digital downloading: defining
and enforcing rights for them and songwriters in contracts, and maintaining incentives.
A songwriter’s incentive to create and produce a new song would be fostered on the fact that
they are receiving just compensation from record companies receiving their product. The songwriter
trusts that the publishers will not abuse their power for their own gain. If a songwriter delves into legal
matters with record companies or feel that they can’t keep at least their reservation wage, they could
lose their incentive to create or distribute new songs for the record companies to publish. When the
production of new songs goes down, record companies will begin to make additional adjustments to the
core structures and mainly in the rights of songwriters and establishing better definitions of what
constitutes a sale and what should be considered licensing in the digital world.
The main applications for defining intellectual property rights and enforcement in this thesis is
to explore an actual case that is said to be groundbreaking for all songwriters in the music industry, and
will collect data on other cases currently in court and see if there was a significant decrease in
production. The theory derived to test a songwriter and his or her relationship with a record company is
fairly simple. There is a songwriter and a record company, and the songwriter has a copyright that they
choose to share with the record company. The record company will promote, and distribute the song to
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all outlets available, including the internet. Assuming both the record company and the songwriter want
to maximize profit, the record company will either count the success of the song as a sale or a license,
whichever makes them more money. The songwriter will most likely want the company to license the
song since most contracts state they will get a larger amount from licensing than sales since licensing
will allow an individual reproduce and gain profit from the songwriter’s song. As the songwriter
becomes more popular among consumers, the record company will continue to record and distribute
the songwriter’s product and will set out the gain as much revenue as they possibly can. On the other
hand, if the songwriter is underpaid, they will lose incentive to produce new music and the production
of new music will decrease. This finding will be evidence to show that adjustments to contracts made
between the record company and the songwriter to define contract terms concerning intellectual
property could be instrumental in maintaining incentive and overall production.

26

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data was collected from the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to give an actual
account of contracts, royalties, and the affect they have on overall production. The discography of four
artists: Kenny Rogers, Sister Sledge, Al Yankovic, and Public Enemy artist Chuck D is given to evaluate the
amount of production before and after each artist sued their respective record companies for
underpayment.
In a particular court case, Aftermath Records, a company operated by Universal Music Group
(UMG) Recordings, versus F.B.T. Productions, LLC is considered a groundbreaking case concerning this
very issue. In a summary given by the United States Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff,
F.B.T. Productions, claims that the company received digital royalties as a result of sales rather than as a
result of licenses. The contract, originally established in 1995 with record company Aftermath records,
songwriters F.B.T. Productions, and the artist who publicly performed F.B.T.’s songs, rap artist Marshall
Mathers whose stage name is Eminem, gave all rights to F.B.T. This didn’t include digital rights. The
courts make it a point to mention the contract agreement stated that F.B.T would receive 50% of all
sales from a masters license (the equivalent of a license in this thesis). Masters refers to the recording,
yet there was no definition of a license mentioned in the agreement. The agreement also included a
provision called records sold (the equivalent of a sale in this thesis), which promised this production
company 12%-20% of royalties. From 2001 to 2003, with no change to the contract, UMG Recordings
established agreements with Apple Inc. and several cellular phone companies to sell and distribute
master recordings through iTunes and ringtones. In 2003, F.B.T and Aftermath Records renewed their
contract agreement, which provided the same contract terms of records sold and masters licenses with
an increase to the royalty rates, where the percentage of each was not provided. The court’s document
stated that in 2004 the contract added that “Sales of Albums by way of permanent download shall be
treated as net sales for the purposes of escalations,” where escalations are “Increases in the royalty rate
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when total album sales surpass certain targets.” The sale of digital downloads were obviously
mentioned during the new negotiations, but it is unclear what the exact contract terms were. That
discrepancy led to F.B.T.’s first case involvement with the courts in 2006, claiming Aftermath was
counting digital downloads as their record sales when the two parties supposedly agreed to count them
as masters license. Aftermath argued otherwise, stating that the 2004 amendment between the two
stated the parties agreed downloads would be treated as sales. The judge declared that “the
agreements were reasonably susceptible to either party’s interpretation,” and did not award F.B.T.
anything, but awarded Aftermath $2.4 million dollars in legal fees.
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In 2009, Hollywood Reporter showed an audit report displaying the difference between sales
and licenses sold, according to an audit conducted by the plaintiff, amounts to over $3,000,000. The
New York Times reports, “Unlike physical sales, where the record company manufactures each disc and
has incremental costs, when they license to iTunes, all they do is turn over one master,” said Richard S.
Busch, a lawyer for F.B.T. “It’s only fair that the artist should receive 50% of the receipts.” F.B.T.
appealed the court’s decision and went back to court in 2010. The songwriters further argued that the
contracts were ambiguous between Aftermath Records, and the courts needed to decide if music
downloads followed the guide of “records sold” or “masters license.” The courts decided that the
revenue Aftermath Records did make from iTunes, were indeed “masters” and were used as if they
were licenses and not sales. As a result, the reward of attorney fees for Aftermath Records was reversed
and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Aftermath Records tried to overturn the decision
by taking the case to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. As of 2012,
F.B.T. Productions has filed a supplemental complaint over permanent downloads that was not
mentioned in previous court hearings (previous hearings concerned conditional downloads, music that is
purchased for a limited amount of time), which the court has granted. The court has ordered Aftermath
to record conditional digital downloads as masters licenses instead of sales, and pay the money F.B.T.
claimed the record company owed. The court is now deciding if the record company should pay F.B.T.
money for permanent downloads.
This case shows how the ambiguity between sales and licenses in a contract can cause friction
between a record company and a songwriter in the case of digital downloading. However, did this lead
to a decrease in publishing by F.B.T Productions? Did the lack of clarification hinder the artists
associated with Aftermath Records incentives to create or perform music? Or does the record company,
in this case Aftermath Records, not distribute or promote as much? Marshall Mathers, recorded his last
song with Aftermath Records in 2010 and with F.B.T. in 2009. After 2010, Marshall Mathers departed
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from Aftermath and started his own record company and produced their first album in 2012. Although
the record was digitally distributed and had little promotion according to the artist website, the album
still landed on the Billboard Charts and sold 171,000 copies in its first week. It could be stated that the
confusion in contracts didn’t lead to a decrease in production or incentives for this songwriter.
Aftermath Records hasn’t produced, distributed, or promoted any new music since 2010, and
F.B.T Productions hasn’t produced any new music 2009, during which time their court case was being
heard in court. In this case, the ambiguity of contract terms and residual claims deeply affected record
companies as well as the songwriters. As a result of the contract structure, the number of CDs produced
after the contract structure was argued in court, decreased considerably compared to the number of
CDs produced before the legal issues began. Yet there is no way to tell if the incentive to create new
music decreased.
There are some lawsuits in the music world that could be considered as evidence of decreased
production. Of all the artists that sued record companies for underpayment, the production before and
after the lawsuits against the record company was tracked to compare the changes, if any, in production
of new music from each artist. If production before is no different than the production after the lawsuit,
or if the production even increases in the market, then there is no need to worry about the
underpayment of artists and songwriters from an economic standpoint. However, if there is a decline in
production, then some adjustments should be made to clearly define what is considered a sale and what
is considered a license to satisfy songwriters while keeping record companies happy with the revenue
they bring in. Four artists, Kenny Rogers, Sister Sledge, Al Yankovic, and Chuck D from the group Public
Enemy, which filed or settled lawsuits in February 2012 were observed as far as production before and
after the lawsuit settled. Every lawsuit was filed by the artist for underpayment of royalties from digital
downloading revenue. Each artist was chosen from articles that were found in the same month and year
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regarding the same issue of underpayment. The discography of each artist was used to track the
production of new music. All discographies were taken from the official website for each artist, with the
exception of Sister Sledge, whose website was under construction. Instead the discography was taken
from a website focusing on the music history for all artists. The artists are listed in Table 6.
Table 5.1 Observation of Artist Production
Artist/Songwriter Number of
Year of Lawsuit
Albums Before
Lawsuit
Kenny Rogers
49
2012
Chuck D
12
2011
Sister Sledge
16
2012
Al Yankovic
28
2012

Number of
Albums After the
Lawsuit
1
2
0
1

Production of
New Music
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

For example, Kenny Rogers has consistently created new music up until 2012, when he filed his
lawsuit in court. Since then, he only has one new album produced. It’s not clear if production actually
decreased from a result of filing lawsuits of underpayment. For this observation, this may be because
the span of time between the lawsuit filing and the time this paper is written is extremely short. Another
reason is because most of the artists observed are older and have been working in the music industry
many years before they filed the lawsuit. For those artists who are currently producing new music
despite their lawsuit shows that there are no production issues for record companies and consumers.
There are some issues plaguing these two examples. The first issue being the amount of time
that has surpassed to make a comparison between production before and after lawsuits were filed in
court. All empirical evidence mentioned are currently ongoing cases. Another issue is the fact that it is
not certain if record companies made began to record digital downloads as licenses rather than sales
after lawsuits were filed, and how that affects the production. When the cases have been heard and
final judgment has been given, it will be easier to compare production.
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Another theory would be the case of older artists versus younger or new artists. There are more
cases of older artists, who have been creating music for many years, or older meaning they haven’t
created new music in many years being underpaid from digital royalties. It is said that the case between
Aftermath and F.B.T is a crucial case for these artists because if the verdict turns out in F.B.T.’s favor,
then older artists could easily begin to renew the contracts they have with record companies to earn
more money or even sue the record companies for the money they haven’t received from the time they
stopped creating new music until now. That begs the question of if there is a pattern of older artists
being paid through sale royalties, while newer artists and songwriters are paid through licensing
royalties. There is a point that most contract negotiations done before the year 2000 had no need to
negotiate terms over digital music. Now that digital music downloading has become such an integral
part of the music industry, younger, more current artists automatically include a clause for digital music.
So it’s very possible that all older artists who negotiated and signed contracts before the year 2000 do
not consider digital music provisions, which means they were paid royalties through sales and not
licenses. This is why we see the increase in older artists, who haven’t renewed contract terms go to
court to sue over digital music royalties. This observation gives support to the theory of contract
structure and contract terms in the music industry. Another test considered was the theory that the
more successful songwriters are; the more likely they are paid through licensing royalties than sale
royalties. With a current successful artist, for example, being measured as a songwriter who songs
makes more than a million dollars during one particular year, it could give the artist more incentive to
influence the contract terms with the record company, to promote their music in concerts, interviews,
and other outlets. This gives the record companies more opportunity to make a bigger profiting licensing
the songwriters profit than outright selling it. Of all the lawsuits presented to the courts, none of the
artists would be considered successful in the year they filed their lawsuits, which was either 2011 or
2012. However, finding the data to this theory proved difficult and there is no clear evidence that this is
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true. As far as the hypothesis that though laws are adjusted as more outlets become available over time
to maintain marginal benefit for songwriters and record companies and maintain production of new
music, some applications included in this paper support the hypothesis more than others. For instance,
in the case study, contracts between the songwriters and the record company did adjust to
accommodate the new outlets of distributing music, and the production of new music of the songwriter
and the record company decreased as a result of their ongoing court battle. However, in the
applications of older artists and of artists who have sued over royalty underpayment, the production of
new music from the artists ranged from minimal to nothing even before the introduction of digital
music, and nothing in their contracts with their respective record companies did not include provisions
for music downloading through the internet. Therefore the hypothesis that the production decreased
due to the contract agreement is not supported.
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CONCLUSION
The topic of intellectual property rights in the music industry has no one clear answer and will
continue to be an interesting topic over time. Overall, through this analysis, this paper shows the
pertinence of contract structure and how clear terms and provisions should be defined to diminish
conflict between record companies and songwriters, or any other parties in the music industry. One also
learns the importance of royalty setting as it relates to production and the success of all artists,
regardless of their success and experience in the industry. The cost of establishing these contracts could
be expensive, but the marginal costs of ignoring the making of certain terms clearly defined could prove
to be higher for record companies in the form of legal battles with songwriters in the future. Even
though the internet has provided great advances as well as setbacks in the music industry, the internet
classified as a new distribution outlet for songwriters is still unclear. Record companies still hold major
power in distribution and have used the digital world to their advantage for marketing and advertising
strategies. From observing the artists in this thesis, production approximately remains the same after
lawsuits are settled, so there is not enough evidence to make the claim that production decreases.
However, the case between Aftermath Records and F.B.T. Productions noted a change in production for
the record company and other companies responsible for production. A variety of artists and cases to
examine, may have afforded more variation in the results.
A testable implication could be testing (focusing just on digital sales) if money received from
licensing is substantially more than money received from sales of a song. It could show that those
copyright holders do have a valid claim that present general contract negotiations concerning the
internet isn’t profit maximizing for the songwriters. Another test could be to use data from the annual
reports of performing rights organizations. Data collection on distribution of royalties collected by all
artists, like Ivan Pitt’s analysis, using empirical data to find the optimal value that artists would want to
receive. Using the data could help the record companies’ decision to give out royalties through sales or
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licensing practices and could determine the amount of incentives for the songwriter. Also, looking at the
production of music or the amount of digital recordings produced, a conclusion can be made if contracts
need to be adjusted to fit the new digital era. Using the data from the annual reports, reports of
royalties, sales, and money received from licenses could be used to test effects the theory of asset
ownership implications of ex ante and ex post decisions in contracts. Even finding the financial reports
of specific artists’ revenue on exactly what songs the artists received in sales royalties and what the
artist received in license royalties. Data could also be collected of the production of songwriters who are
currently in court for underpayment of royalties and compare their production with a songwriter who is
not in any lawsuit. Comparing the differences in production between a songwriter in court and a
songwriter who is not would show how production is affected by ambiguous contracts and royalty
underpayment. This data would be a starting point to develop an improved model of contracts in the
music industry that fits more closely with a particular economic model.
This research has presented a new perspective on intellectual property and the enforcement of
contract terms in the music industry. The biggest problem that drew many artists to court to sue record
companies was the fact that most digital downloading revenue was listed by record companies as sales
rather than licenses, which in turn gives artists a greater payment in royalties. This paper attempted to
observe the change in production before and after lawsuits was filed in court by a different range of
artists. Though none of the lawsuits that have been heard in court to date have reached a final judgment
by a judge, the cases show how difficult it is to have clear contract terms between record companies and
songwriters in the case of digital downloading. The production of new songs from both sides has been
affected comparing the amount of new music produced before their lawsuits and the music produced as
their cases are being heard.
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